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Abstract
A large number of child deaths in developing countries could be averted if ill children received
care sooner rather than later. This paper analyses the healthcare treatment pathway that is
followed for children under the age of six. The majority of these children receive treatment
within 24 hours. However, we ￿nd that income a⁄ects the probability of any treatment, despite
freely available public healthcare, while delayed treatment for severely ill children is more likely
to occur in more expensive private facilities. Our results suggest that free public healthcare is
not enough to mitigate health inequality amongst young children, and that delayed healthcare
could lead to adverse household expenditure shocks.
JEL: I12, D13, C35
1 Introduction
Despite heavy public investment and global health care initiatives, high child morbidity and mortality
is still prominent in developing countries, and the illnesses behind the observed morbidity and
mortality are largely preventable.1 The United Nations Children￿ s Fund (UNICEF, 2007) estimates
that as many as half of all child deaths could be averted through inexpensive health practices,
including better child healthcare decision-making. Terra de Souza, Peterson, Andrade et al (2000)
￿nd that poor and/or delayed health-seeking for children contributes up to 70% of child death;
however, ensuring prompt and appropriate care-seeking is one of the practices for which there is
the least health policy intervention experience (Hill, Kendall, Arthur et al, 2001). Given that most
children survive into adulthood, prompt and better health care decisions or other investments into
child health are likely to have e⁄ects beyond averting childhood mortality and morbidity. Adler,
Boyce, Chesney et al (1994), Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002) and Case, Fertig and Paxson (2005),
for example, show that low levels of child health investments have far-reaching negative consequences
to social, educational, economic, and health outputs for those children upon reaching adulthood.
One investment of particular relevance to this research is the set of decisions made on behalf of
children, who depend on adult caregivers, typically parents, to act in their best interests. In other
￿The authors would like to thank participants at the Conference on Income Distribution and the Family, Christos
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1Infant and childhood mortality rates, caused largely by infectious diseases, particularly Acute Respiratory Infec-
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1words, adult caregivers and the constraints they face within their household and family structures
will strongly in￿ uence child health outcomes.2 As noted by Jacobsen (2000), the household does not
only demand and consume health care; the household is also an important producer of prevention,
health care and health, in general. In considering health care, whether or not to use health services
is a choice households often have to make. Regardless of the nature of the health care need, Pokhrel
and Sauberborn (2004) suggest that health care decisions are complex processes involving several
steps that are not an end in themselves; instead, as has been further argued by Cardol, Groenewegen,
De Bakker et al (2005) and Ha, Burman and Larson (2002), these complex decision processes are
in￿ uenced by various, sometimes independent and sometimes interwoven, factors.
In this paper, we examine a pathway model of health-seeking behaviour for children under the
age of six, where the behavioural decisions are likely to be driven by adult caregivers, as well as
household resource and structure constraints. The analysis is set within a sequence of health-seeking
behavioural events, from detection of child illness, to the decision to seek treatment (either imme-
diately or later), to the facility sought for treatment, similar to that suggested by Kroeger (1983),
Pokhrel et al (2004) and Pokhrel, Snow, Dong et al (2005). However, instead of assuming indepen-
dence from one decision to the next, we allow for the empirical conditioning of previous outcomes on
the current decision. A nested model of the decision process, based on inverse probability weighting
to account for conditionality, is applied to World Health Survey (WHS) data collected in South
Africa in 2002 (WHS, 2003) to estimate our pathway model. The empirical exposition discerns the
e⁄ect of structures (e.g., caregiver marital status and household size), household resource constraints
and illness severity on the timing of health-seeking decisions, following the initial observation of a
child￿ s illness, providing policy relevant information with regard to the timing of treatment and
factors a⁄ecting both treatment timing and facility choice, conditioned on that timing.
In South Africa, in an e⁄ort to reduce health inequalities tied to income inequalities, public
healthcare for children under the age of six is available for free. Therefore, we would expect that
income would not a⁄ect child treatment decisions. However, our results show that the poorest
children are still the least likely to be treated, suggesting that public health policy could still do
more for the poorest children. We also ￿nd that the severity of illness is an important determinant
for the receipt of care for these children. Furthermore, the severity of illness for children that have
not received immediate treatment is a strong predictor of private health facility usage, implying that
households do not hold much faith in the public health sector￿ s ability to improve the health of the
most severely ill children. Also, the delay associated with seeking private care for the most severely
ill children implies large household expenditure shocks, which may create further inequalities across
households unless these shocks can be mitigated through other avenues, such as social insurance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We continue, in Section 2, by describing the pathway
model that we use in the analysis. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. The results of
the analysis are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes, considering policy related concerns
and potential avenues of future research.
2 Empirical Methodology
Among the several models for explaining health seeking behaviour and its surrounding complexity,
two basic approaches have been identi￿ed. Kroeger (1983) distinguishes these two approaches as
the pathway model and the determinants model. The pathway model assumes a logical sequence of
steps, e.g., decisions are taken from the earliest symptoms through to the decision to use health care
services, as well as which type of service. The pathway model or ￿illness career￿approach has its roots
in medical sociology and anthropology, and, as its name implies, represents a dynamic process.3 A
2The family holds the primary responsibility for the protection, upbringing and development of children who are
entitled to receive comprehensive protection and support, UNICEF (2001)
3Pescosolido (1992) de￿nes the ￿illness career￿as the sequence of actions surrounding the recti￿cation of a health
problem.
2number of qualitative methodological approaches have modeled the health care utilization decision-
making process by elaborating on patient action and interaction, as well as the stages or pathways
that result in facility contact.4 However, quantitative evidence underpinning the aforementioned
qualitative decision process has been sparse. The determinants model, on the other hand, focuses on
variables explaining preferred health care service choices, and tends to be a static analysis focusing
on one particular decision within the decision-making process. Current empirical literature has
identi￿ed some demand (e.g, family headship, age, gender of family head, employment status and
education level of the parent, availability of social protection, quality of the services and income)
and supply (e.g., prices and health facility characteristics) factors that a⁄ect decisions to utilize
health facilities.5 Salgado De Snyder, Diaz-Perez, Maldonando et al (1998), however, note that
most quantitative research on health-seeking behaviour has focused on identifying and describing
the barriers to health services utilization as the end-point of the analysis, and, thus, failed to o⁄er
empirical evidence at any decision node along the pathway, except at the ￿nal health services contact
node.
2.1 Discussion
In this analysis, we consider only households with young children, and the pathway surrounding
healthcare decisions for those children. The pathway model assumes that decisions regarding child
health care are dynamic in nature and in￿ uenced by household characteristics, especially the in-
volvement of the parents. The importance of parental resources, behaviour and household structure
on a child￿ s health is evident in the large di⁄erences that exist in children￿ s health outcomes.6 The
young children in the household may or may not become sick at any point in time. Importantly,
though, if the child becomes ill, someone in the household will need to identify that the child is
ill, thus placing the child in an ￿ illness career￿ . Once an illness has been observed, the caretaker
in the household must then determine an action; presumably, the caretaker decides either to seek
treatment immediately for the child or to wait to see if the symptoms become worse. If immediate
treatment is chosen, the caretaker will also need to determine whether to seek treatment through a
private or a public facility. On the other hand, if the caretaker decided to wait, initially, then, at a
later stage, the caretaker will once again be required to determine if care should be sought outside
the home, and, if so, whether care should be sought at a public or private facility. Therefore, not
seeking treatment for the sick child results from not having previously chosen to treat the child.
The perception or recognition of illness is the ￿rst important stage in the sequence of health
care. According to Suchman (1965), problem identi￿cation occurs at this stage and without that
identi￿cation no health care would be sought. Perez-Cuevas, Guiscafre, Romero et al (1996), Bojajil,
Kirkwood, Bobak et al (2002) and Pokhrel et al (2004) have all identi￿ed symptom recognition and
perception as a barrier to care-seeking.7 However, in order to place the child in an ￿illness career￿ ,
the child must be accepted in the sick role. Acceptance into this role depends primarily upon
maternal recognition of certain signs and symptoms of child illness, such as illness severity.8
4Suchman (1965) was ￿rst to describe the process of illness behaviour as a logical sequence of steps, beginning
with the perception and evaluation of symptoms and concluding with the use of di⁄erent health facilities.
5Ensuring the availability of essential supplies, equipment and medication is a necessary requirement for good
quality health care. However, child survival, growth and development depend not only on the food intake and health
but also on caregiver behaviours, Engle, Menon and Haddad (1997).
6Lindelow (2004) found that a biological child of the head of the household is more likely to be immunized.
Similarly, Astone and McLanahan (1991) found that children receive less parental time and attention in single parent
families. While, Coreil (1983) observed, in the case of rural Haiti, that the opportunity cost of taking children to
health facilities is greatest in single-adult households.
7Pokhrel et al (2004) indicate that di⁄erential child mortality in Nepal may be due to di⁄erential health care
access arising primarily from illness perception, not necessarily from the decisions to seek care or spend money on
sick children.
8Teerawichitchainan and Phillips (2008), in their multinomial logit study of Vietnamese data, discovered that child
sex, ethnicity, the number of siblings and maternal education are important determinants of reported illness.
3Another set of steps in the health decision trajectory is tied into investments in health recovery,
either through the consultation of an external health worker or through natural recovery and the
timing of that investment. Thus, the household is assumed, at this stage, to make a complex decision
that is revealed through the timing of their health-seeking behaviours. The decision is assumed to
be consistent with its utility maximization objective, subject to the household budget constraint;
however, it is likely to be quite dynamic, even at this stage. It is also reasonable to assume that
caretakers confront a series of binary (treat/no treat) decisions.9 However, in our data, it is only
possible to see if care is sought within 24 hours or after 24 hours. Therefore, we abstract from this
series of intermittent decisions, focusing only upon the outcomes that can be identi￿ed in the data:
immediate treatment (within 24 hours), delayed treatment (after at least 24 hours), or no treatment
(resulting from in￿nite, with respect to the illness symptoms, delay). This series of steps in the
decision trajectory, however, is important, since a number of childhood diseases leading to death
could be reduced if appropriate treatment was given in a timely manner.10
The medical care contact stage is the ￿nal leg of the path to be modeled; in a wide variety of
analyses, it is the only step in the path to be considered.11 Households are assumed to make use of
a knowledgeable health care provider from either the public or private sector. Although this is the
last stage of the household analysis in our model, due to data considerations, it is likely that the
healthcare provider will present additional decisions related to treatment and treatment compliance
(Homedes and Ugalde, 2001; Fadil, Alrahman, Cousens et al, 2003).
2.2 The Model
Assumed in the preceding discussion of caretaker decisions, therefore, is a sequential process with
￿ve distinct nodes: (A) observe illness, (B) given an observed illness, treat immediately, (C) given
both illness and immediate treatment, determine facility for treatment, (D) given illness, but not
immediate treatment, determine if any treatment is needed at all, (E) given illness and later treat-
ment, determine facility for that treatment. This decision process is illustrated in Figure 1, along
with the number of children in each cell from the WHS-South Africa dataset.
For discussion and analysis purposes, we will assume that illnesses are random events, such
that treatment and facility choices do not determine whether or not a child is observed to be ill.12
Therefore, nodes (B)￿ (E) are sequentially independent from node (A). For the econometrician, a
number of modeling choices for outcomes (B)￿ (E) are plausible, given various assumptions about the
data, the unobserved factors, and the decision process undertaken by the caregiver. The outcomes or
decisions made at each node could be modeled as a simultaneous process or as part of a sequential
process. Assuming simultaneity, one could model the outcomes as a multinomial logit (MNL),
assuming that the error terms were Type I extreme valued. However, the error terms are assumed
to be independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in the MNL, and, therefore, it is often preferable
to consider a nested logit (NL) model, that relaxes the IIA assumption.13 Given the structure
of the data, which provides a dynamic context to the outcomes, the MNL is unlikely to ￿t the
context. In a sequential logit model (SL), on the other hand, each decision is assumed to be
independent of the preceding decisions.14 Even though each decision must be independent, at
9For example, they may wait until the morning to see if there are signs of improvement. In the morning, they may
decide to wait a bit longer.
10Bojalil et al (2002) and Hill et al (2003) focus upon the potential reduction in deaths that could result amongst
both the large number of children who die in developing countries without reaching a health facility, and the large
number who die shortly after arrival at healthcare facilities if treatment delay were reduced.
11See, for example, Grobler and Stuart (2007), Bolduc, LaCroix and Muller (1996) and Dor, Gertler and Van der
Gaag (1987) for Africa speci￿c examples of health facility choice focusing speci￿cally on a single component of the
decision tree.
12The WHO survey only focuses upon the youngest child in the household, assuming that the child is no more than
￿ve years of age. Therefore, the plausibility that illnesses are clustered within households cannot be considered.
13Other models, such as mixed models, could also be used to relax the IIA assumption of the MNL.
14The SL is similar in character to a two-part model, also referred to as a hurdle model, such as that discussed by
4least from a duration perspective, it is also true that the econometrician cannot observe all the
factors a⁄ecting each decision, and, therefore, unobserved factors could be correlated through the
sequence of decisions. If unobserved factors are correlated through the decision sequence, sample
selection might be a problem, requiring corrections similar to those proposed by Heckman (1979),
requiring strict assumptions on the structural form of the error correlation. Furthermore, since
there are a number of steps in the decision process, and di⁄erent selection criteria may apply at
di⁄erent point along the decision tree, a more nuanced approach to controlling for selection has
merit. Correcting for sample selection, though, requires exclusion restrictions, which are not often
available in cross-section data.
Therefore, we model selection by applying inverse probability weighting, as suggested by Woodridge
(2002). This method is similar to propensity score matching, as widely applied in the literature.15
Importantly, selection is con￿ned to variables that are observable to the econometrician. The sub-
sequent selected observations are reweighted to account for the probability of being observed, and
the resulting standard errors are conservative, in the sense that second stage standard errors do not
need to be corrected, Wooldridge (2002).
Formally de￿ne yij = f0;1gfor each child i and the outcome observed at decision node j =
fB;C;D;Eg.16 As described above, each child will have an outcome for j = A; however, only
children observed ill at node A will have an outcome for nodes j. De￿ning the probability of a
positive outcome as pj = Ej (yj = 1jxj;￿1;j ￿ 2;:::;1) - which depends on the path of decisions ￿
we can estimate this probability via equation (1).17
pj = Fj
￿
xj￿j;"j jj ￿ 1;j ￿ 2;:::;1
￿
(1)
In this analysis, we model Fj as linear in its arguments, and we model "j as a Type I extreme-
valued error term, such that logit regression can be applied.
As implied by (1), each probability depends upon the path of preceding decisions. If those
preceding decisions are correlated with , it is necessary to account for that correlation, which we do
through the inclusion of inverse probability weights. Given the structure assumed in the decision
process, facility choice, given immediate treatment, is independent of facility choice, given delayed
treatment; therefore, we do not weight according to the predicted probability of immediate public
treatment in the delayed public treatment model. Furthermore, given the assumption that illnesses
are random, we do not worry about the probability of illness in the subsequent decision processes.
The resulting estimated equations are:
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(2)
As implied in the preceding equations (2), the determining variables are allowed to be di⁄erent,
such that exclusion restrictions could be accommodated. However, in this analysis, given the lack of
suitable exclusion restrictions, we assume that selection is driven by observed values, and, therefore,
the determinants will be the same in each regression.
Tobin (1958) and Mullahy (1986), although in this example there are far more than two parts to the analysis, and
the following outcomes are binary.
15Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide an excellent survey of the wide applications in the literature, including
inverse probability weighting
16Unless otherwise necessary, we drop child-speci￿c subscripts for ease of exposition.
17For further ease of exposition, we do not describe our model in terms of an underlying random utility model,
given how ubiquitous that description is in the literature. McFadden (1974), amongst many others, provides a more
formal derivation.
53 Data and Analysis Variables
3.1 The WHS
The data for this study is taken from the South African portion of the WHS carried out in 70 countries
during 2002-3; the South African survey was conducted in 2002. The survey was developed and
implemented by the World Health Organization, in order to compile valid, reliable and comparable
comprehensive information on the health of the population and on the outcomes associated with
investments in various national health systems, ￿st￿n, Chatterji, Villanueva et al (2001). The survey
is primarily designed to develop an evidence-based dataset to monitor whether health systems are
achieving their desired goals, as well as to provide the evidence base that policymakers need to
improve their policies, strategies and programs, WHS (2003).18
Wagner, Reiss, Johnson et al (2007) judged the overall quality of the data to be satisfactory for
any quantitative analysis that could be considered. Obermeyer, Murray and Gakidou (2008) also
found the data to be representative in their analysis of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia.
In addition to cross-country studies, the data has also been used, albeit in limited instances, to
focus on speci￿c countries, like South Africa.19 Based on the reliability of the WHS data observed
by previous researchers, our analysis makes use of the WHS 2002 South Africa Survey, which consists
of 2345 households and 10500 individuals. However, the WHS does have its limitations. The main
one being that the econometric analysis is applied on a reduced sample, since there is only one
surveyed child under the age of ￿ve in any household, due to the design of the instrument. The ￿nal
analysis dataset consisted of 520 households. In 342 of them, illnesses were observed in the children;
however, complete independent data were available for only 332.
Despite the limited number of observations, negative health events are observed for nearly two-
thirds of the children, and these include observations of fever, coughing, diarrhea, vomiting and many
other common a› ictions; see Table 1 for a more detailed description. In addition to these negative
health events, this data allows us to consider the timing associated with illness treatments, one of the
few data sets allowing for such analysis. The data also contains detailed socioeconomic information
on the household, including household expenditure on health (unfortunately not speci￿cally for the
negative child health event analyzed) and the child￿ s health insurance coverage status. Although
there are a limited number of observations, signi￿cant estimates are obtained for many variables.
We can also be sure that signi￿cant results are not merely driven by the size of the dataset, and,
therefore, policy recommendations are likely to be quite robust, even in our small sample.
3.2 Analysis Variables
The empirical model assumes that households maximize utility by following the optimal healthcare
pathway, for the sake of children under the age of ￿ve; therefore, the empirical speci￿cation includes
various socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the household. Previous studies suggest
that parents pay closer attention to their own children than the children of others.20 Therefore, we
control for both single-parent households and whether or not the child lives with their biological par-
ent. Economically, we also expect family income and access to insurance coverage to a⁄ect household
health decisions. As shown by Anyanwu (2007), Dong, Gbangou, De Allegri et al (2008) as well as
Novignon and Aglobitse (2008), income is a strong predictor of facility choice in developing countries.
Although access to household income is likely to be important, insurance cover in South Africa is
18Data in the WHS was collected on a modular basis. The modules address di⁄erent aspects of the health system and
include information on health insurance, health expenditures, socio-demographics, income, health state evaluations,
health system responsiveness and health system goals.
19Lamiraud, Booysen and Scheil-Adlung (2005) analysed the impact of social health protection on access to health
care, health expenditure and impoverishment in South Africa using the WHS-South Africa data.
20Lindelow (2004) found that children were more likely to be immunized, if living with their parents. Similarly,
Astone and McLanahan (1991) found that children in single parent families received less parental time, while Coreil
(1983) observed that the opportunity cost of taking children to health facilities was greater in single parent households.
6strongly correlated with income, although insurance cover is primarily determined by employment,
which limits concerns over the simultaneity of both income and insurance. Notably, only 15% of
the children in our data are covered by insurance, further limiting worries over simultaneity. In this
analysis, we include non-linear measures of income ￿expenditure quartiles are used as a proxy for
income quartiles ￿and insurance coverage.21 We also include categorical measures of family size
to account for additional household resource constraints. Medically, we expect that illness severity
is an important factor in health-seeking behaviour. Although severity is not directly measured, we
control for this by including categorical counts of the number of reported symptoms related to the
child￿ s observed illness.
4 The Results
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we provide a brief discussion of the data that is used in
this analysis. Those descriptive statistics and data de￿nitions are presented in Table 1. Nearly 66%
of the children under age ￿ve have been reported ill, yet only a fraction more than 15% are covered
by a South African medical scheme (health insurance policy). The number of symptoms reported
for the child￿ s most recent illness is nearly equally split between one, two, three and four or more.
These children tend to live with their biological parents (62%), and the head of their household is
normally married (61%). Average household expenditure was R1 389 per month (approximately
US$133.25 in 2002), while the average household exceeded six individuals. Of the children reported
ill, about 20% were not treated, 53% were treated immediately, while the remainder were treated
after some delay. The majority of treated children received their treatment from a public facility ￿
70% if treated immediately and 61% if treated after some delay.
4.1 Treatment Timing
The ￿rst set of empirical results, reported for treatment timing, are presented in Table 2. This table
contains both the coe¢ cient estimates and the marginal e⁄ects for each of the treatment options,
according to timing of decision: immediate treatment versus later or no treatment and delayed
treatment compared to no treatment, conditional on not having received treatment to that point.22
In the ￿rst two columns, coe¢ cient and marginal e⁄ects estimates for the immediacy of treatment
are presented, while the estimates for choice of treatment (or not) following some delay are in the
￿nal two columns.
Immediate treatment is more likely for children in the 3rd expenditure quartile, about 13.8%
more likely. Although children living in more traditional households, in which the household head
is married, have a 14.6% higher probability of receiving immediate treatment, that drops by 19.7%
if the household is smaller than average, and by 29.8% if the household is approximately average
sized. In other words, a single child in a two-parent household is about 5% less likely to receive
immediate care, as the household size e⁄ect dominates the dual parent e⁄ect. On the other hand,
one medically encouraging result is that the immediacy of treatment is driven by the observation of
a large number of symptoms ￿observing more than three symptoms results in a 21.9% increase in
the probability of immediate treatment. Treatment timing (immediate or not) does not appear to
be strongly in￿ uenced by either income or insurance cover, although children in the third quartile
of expenditure are 13.8% more likely to receive immediate care. Instead, immediacy is associated
with both symptoms and the availability of additional household members capable of either taking
the child for care or watching over the household.
21Spearman correlations between income quartile, from lowest to highest, and insurance cover were -0.02, -0.07,
-0.05 and 0.13, respectively.
22All explanatory variables are dummy variables; therefore, marginal e⁄ects are calculated as the di⁄erence in
predicted probability between the two possible values for the indicator, one or zero.
7Just under half (see Table 1) of the sick children do not receive immediate care. If these children
were not treated immediately, they could be treated later. In the second stage of the analysis,
we consider delayed treatment, which can only be observed for children that were not immediately
treated. Assuming selection on observable values, we reweight the data for the immediately untreated
individuals, or all of the children remaining in the subsample, according to the inverse of their
predicted probabilities of not being immediately treated.23 The results indicate that male children
that were not immediately treated have a lower probability (15.3%) of being treated, after a delay.
However, children living with a biological parent have a 31.3% higher probability of being treated
after a delay than not being treated at all (given that they were not immediately treated). As with
immediate treatment, the number of observed symptoms plays a role in determining whether or
not treatment is, in the end, sought. Children with at least three and with three or more observed
symptoms are 21.7% and 23.8%, respectively, more likely to be treated than not, conditional on
not having received immediate care. More tellingly, income, as measured by expenditure, plays an
important role in the probability that a child does receive at least some treatment. Conditional
delayed treatment is 24.0% more likely for children in the second quartile and 25.5% more likely for
children in the fourth quartile of the expenditure distribution. Once again, insurance coverage does
not a⁄ect the timing of treatment.
Combining the preceding results, it is notable that children living in households in the lowest
quartile of the expenditure distribution are the least likely to receive any treatment, and that is
despite the fact that all children under the age of 6 are eligible for free public health care in South
Africa. On the other hand, it does appear that children with more severe illnesses are receiving care.
Children with more than three illness symptoms are more likely to be treated immediately, and if
they were not treated immediately, they are also more likely to be treated after a period of delay.
Below, we consider the estimates for facility choice conditional on treatment timing.
4.2 Facility Choice
In Table 3, facility choice logit estimates are presented. Importantly, these results are conditioned
on the timing of treatment. In the ￿rst two columns, facility choice is conditioned on immediate
treatment, while in the ￿nal two columns facility choice is conditioned on both treatment that was
not immediate and treatment after delay.24 Interestingly, despite the fact that male children were
least likely to receive any treatment, they are more likely to receive immediate treatment at a private
facility than are female children, 16.5% more likely. More strikingly, though, is the importance of
insurance cover. Insurance coverage leads to a 45% decrease in the probability of treatment at
a public facility, conditional on immediate treatment. The e⁄ect of income is more nuanced. As
previously noted, children in the third quartile are more likely to receive immediate treatment, and,
conditioning on immediate treatment, they are 24.7% less likely to be treated at a public facility.
In other words, children in the third quartile are more likely to be treated immediately in a private
facility. There is some evidence that children in the highest quartile are more likely to be treated in
private facilities, as well.25
The choice of facility for children treated after a period of delay reveals the limitations of the
small sample sizes, through relatively large standard errors. However, two results are signi￿cant, and
one of these has particular policy relevance. First, children living in households, in which the head is
married, are 24.7% less likely to receive their delayed care in public facilities. Second is the estimate
that children with relatively more severe illnesses, as measured by having more than three symptoms,
23As noted above, this is similar in spirit to propensity score matching or selection on observables. The advantage
to inverse probability weighting is that resulting t-stats are conservative, such that standard error corrections are not
necessary, Wooldridge (2002).
24In other words, conditioning on immediate treatment, facility choice logits are inversely weighted by the probability
of immediate treatment, while conditioning on delayed treatment requires weighting on the inverse of two outcome
probabilities: not being treated immediately and being treated after a period of delay.
25Although the marginal e⁄ect is large (22.8%), it is not estimated with enough precision to be signi￿cant.
8are more likely to be treated in private facilities. Conditional on receiving delayed treatment, they
are 33.8% less likely to be treated in public facilities. These results highlight the potential for large
adverse health related expenditure shocks at the household level. Delaying treatment, when a child
is severely ill, may require large out-of-pocket expenditures to cover treatment at private facilities.26
5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The analysis in this paper has considered the treatment pathway of children, under the age of ￿ve,
who have been identi￿ed as being ill to provide further understanding of the timing of treatment for
young children. As noted at the outset, delayed treatment has been attributed to unnecessary child
deaths, Terra de Souza et al (2000). The analysis extends the work of Kroeger (1983) and Pokhrel at
al (2004, 2005) in two ways. First, since it is possible to observe the dynamics of healthcare decisions
in the 2002 WHS ￿South Africa data, these dynamics are modeled in the analysis. Second, the
analysis does not assume that each decision is independent of previous decisions, as was done by
Pokhrel et al (2004, 2005). Instead, each treatment decision is placed within a conditional pathway
model, allowing the decisions from the previous stage to a⁄ect current choices. In the analysis, we
￿nd that income a⁄ects treatment decisions non-linearly. Children in the poorest households are
least likely to receive any treatment, despite the fact that public health care for children under six
￿all children in our sample are under the age of six ￿is free in South Africa. We also ￿nd that
insurance coverage primarily determines treatment choice for children who are immediately treated,
and that they are most likely to be treated in private facilities. Furthermore, our results point to
the importance of the perceived severity of illness. Children with three or more symptoms of illness
are more likely to be treated. They are more likely to be treated immediately, and they are more
likely to be treated after some delay, if they were not treated immediately. More worrying, however,
is that children with multiple symptoms, but were not treated immediately, are much more likely to
be treated at a private facility.
In terms of income and health policy, our results raise a few concerns. The ￿rst is the lack of
treatment received by the poorest children. Despite the fact that public health care is free for all
children in our sample, the poorest children are less likely to be treated. We interpret those results
to mean that the poorest households face further constraints, in addition to facility user fees, when
trying to access healthcare for their children. Although further research is necessary, it is possible
that transport costs are too much for these households to bear. In that case, policymakers would
need to consider ￿nding ways to either bring healthcare to these children or, otherwise, reduce the
cost of getting these children to a healthcare facility. Both mobile clinics and subsidized transport
represent potential policy options. The second concern is based on the increased probability that
severely ill children are receiving their care at private facilities. Although there are a number of
potential interpretations for this observation, we will focus on a few that should worry policymakers.
Delay in treatment, as noted at the outset, may result in poorer health outcomes for these children,
possibly leading to poorer life outcomes. Therefore, one of goal of health policy is to work towards
reducing delay. In terms of policy, although our research cannot address this directly, providing
more education, related to the importance of early treatment, could help. Another interpretation
of these ￿ndings is that household decision-makers have little faith in the public sector￿ s ability to
deliver quality healthcare, suggesting that health policymakers need to work harder to improve the
quality and responsiveness of the public healthcare system. Finally, if household decision-makers are
forced to spend money out-of-pocket to make use of private facilities for their severely ill children,
these households may su⁄er adverse expenditure shocks that could have knock-on detrimental e⁄ects
within the household. In that case, public policy would be better focused on the provision of social
26Although the data contains detailed information on health care costs, these costs include expenditures for any
illness in the household, and not just for the child￿ s illness, and, therefore it is not possible to examine the distribution
of out-of-pocket expenditures for child health care, when that care is delayed.
9health insurance, to alleviate these adverse expenditure shocks.
Although the dataset considered in this analysis is small, the WHS-South Africa contains ex-
tremely detailed information on a wide range of variables, including vignettes regarding equity and
illness symptoms that could be used to determine the ability of household decision-makers to spot
illness in either themselves or other members of the household. The key attribute of this survey, as
it relates to this research, is the fact that the survey asks caregivers whether or not the sick child
received their care within 24 hours, which allows us to empirically investigate both the timing of
treatment and the choice of facility, conditioned on treatment timing. The survey data also provides
information on health care expenditures, reasons for not seeking care and perceptions regarding the
quality of care. All of this information could be used in further research to better understand the
household decision-making process, although it is possible that the analysis would have to focus on
qualitative analysis, given the limited number of observations for certain relevant variables. Finally,
since the WHS surveys were carried out across a wide range of countries, and since the survey in-
struments were very similar across these countries, it is possible to use the data to paint a more
detailed picture of healthcare decisions in a particular region, such as Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Note: Numbers in each category in parentheses.  Numbers do not add up perfectly, as some observations are 
lost since some are not treated at either public or private facilities. 
Figure 1. Illustration of Treatment Decision Tree 
13Table 1. Summary Statistics of Analysis Data 
 Observations Mean  SD
Child Characteristics       
Sick child (=1)  520 0.658  0.47
Male child (=1)  520 0.450  0.50
Insurance cover (=1)  520 0.154  0.36
Child lives with biological parent (= 1)  520 0.617  0.49
One reported illness symptom* (=1)  342 0.234  0.42
Two reported illness symptoms (=1)  342 0.278  0.45
Three reported illness symptoms (=1)  342 0.243  0.43
Four or more reported illness symptoms (=1)  342 0.246  0.43
Treatment     
Child treated immediately (=1)  342 0.532  0.50
Child treated after delay (=1)  342 0.278  0.44
Child not treated (=1)  342 0.190  0.39
Treatment and Facility      
Child treated immediately (Public facility = 1)  177 0.701  0.46
Child treated after delay (Public facility = 1)  90 0.611  0.49
Household Characteristics      
Married head of household (=1)  520 0.608  0.49
Expenditure: 1st Quartile (=1)  520 0.248  0.43
Expenditure: 2nd Quartile (=1)  520 0.271  0.44
Expenditure: 3rd Quartile (=1)  520 0.229  0.42
Expenditure: 4th Quartile (=1)  520 0.231  0.42
Total Expenditure  520 1389.1  2187
Four or less in household (=1)  520 0.310  0.46
Five to seven in household (=1)  520 0.435  0.50
Household Size  520 6.050  2.47
*symptoms include: fever, coughing, fast breathing, diarrhea, blood in stool, vomiting, unable to eat or 
drink, convulsions and other symptoms 
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Table 2. Treatment Logits: Immediate Treatment Conditional on Illness and 
Delayed Treatment Conditional on the Lack of Immediate Treatment 
 
  Immediate Treatment or Not 
Delayed Treatment or Not – Given 
No Immediate Treatment 
VARIABLES Coefficients  Marginal  Effects Coefficients Marginal  Effects 
              
Male child  -0.154  -0.038 -0.652*  -0.153* 
 -0.236  -0.059  -0.393  -0.092 
Biological parent  -0.056 -0.014 1.317*** 0.313*** 
 -0.275  -0.068  -0.467  -0.106 
Expenditure: 2nd Quartile  -0.258 -0.064 1.129** 0.240*** 
 -0.319  -0.079  -0.478  -0.091 
Expenditure: 3rd Quartile 0.568*  0.138*  -0.18  -0.043 
 -0.338  -0.079  -0.535  -0.129 
Expenditure: 4th Quartile 0.249  0.061  1.206**  0.255** 
 -0.33  -0.081  -0.59  -0.106 
Household size (<4)  -0.797**  -0.197**  -0.024  -0.006 
 -0.356  -0.086  -0.597  -0.141 
Household size (5-7)  -1.230***  -0.298***  -0.508  -0.12 
 -0.324  -0.074  -0.517  -0.121 
Covered by insurance  -0.053 -0.013  0.763  0.166 
 -0.32  -0.08  -0.532  -0.105 
Symptoms (=2)  0.464  0.114  -0.743  -0.179 
 -0.333  -0.08  -0.513  -0.124 
Symptoms (=3)  0.317  0.078  1.008*  0.217** 
 -0.345  -0.084  -0.546  -0.105 
Symptoms (>3)  0.922***  0.219***  1.119*  0.238** 
 -0.338  -0.075  -0.605  -0.11 
Married Head of House 0.591**  0.146**  0.118  0.028 
 -0.246  -0.06  -0.409  -0.097 
Constant 0.138    -0.892   
 -0.441    -0.657   
        
Observations 342  342  160  160 
ll -218.2  -218.2  -88.44  -88.44 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3. Logit Estimates and Marginal Effects for Immediate and Delayed 
Treatment at Public Facilities 
 
 
Treatment at a Public Facility –
Given Immediate Treatment 
Treatment at a Public Facility – 
Given Delayed Treatment 
VARIABLES Coefficients  Marginal  Effects Coefficients Marginal  Effects 
              
Male child  0.923**  0.165** -0.268  -0.057 
  (0.413) (0.067) (0.615) (0.132) 
Biological parent  0.917* 0.179 -0.839 -0.166 
  (0.557) (0.114) (0.734) (0.132) 
Expenditure: 2nd Quartile 0.012  0.002  -0.384  -0.084 
  (0.706) (0.129) (0.737) (0.166) 
Expenditure: 3rd Quartile -1.190**  -0.247**  0.391  0.078 
  (0.560) (0.122) (0.937) (0.178) 
Expenditure: 4th Quartile  -1.084*  -0.223 -0.745 -0.166 
  (0.635) (0.140) (0.717) (0.166) 
Household  size  (<4) -0.408 -0.077 -0.398 -0.086 
  (0.642) (0.127) (0.833) (0.183) 
Household size (5-7)  -0.019  -0.003  0.061  0.013 
  (0.493) (0.090) (0.841) (0.178) 
Covered by insurance  -2.057*** -0.454***  -0.558  -0.125 
  (0.551) (0.117) (0.719) (0.169) 
Symptoms  (=2)  -0.534 -0.104 -0.008 -0.002 
  (0.520) (0.106) (0.732) (0.155) 
Symptoms  (=3)  -0.615 -0.121 -0.943 -0.214 
  (0.589) (0.124) (0.708) (0.168) 
Symptoms (>3)  -0.050  -0.009  -1.472*  -0.338* 
  (0.544) (0.101) (0.862) (0.201) 
Married Head of House  -0.519 -0.092  -1.401**  -0.271** 
  (0.467) (0.079) (0.699) (0.125) 
Constant  1.773***  3.358***  
  (0.670)  (1.084)  
      
Observations 177  177  90  90 
ll  -85.95 -85.95 -47.23 -47.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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